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Recent experiencegraphically illustratesthe
acute dilemma authorities can face as a
result ofthis ambiguity. U.S. medium and
long-term interest rates rose by nearly 4
This problem is probably not so serious for
short-term interest rates, since inflation
anticipated over the near-term can often be
gauged from recent inflation trends. Inter-
preting movements in longer-term interest
rates is much more difficult because infla-
tion expected over the next several years
depends critically upon perceptions ofthe
future course ofmonetary policy, which
may not be related in any obvious way to
past developments. However, the longer-
term variations in real interest and expected
inflation rates are likelyto have the greater
influence on economic decisions, and are
thus generally ofgreater concern to
policymakers.
Still, authorities can know only nominal
interest rates with any certainty, since these,
and nottheir real orexpected inflation com-
ponents, are quoted in financial markets.
There is therefore no way to determine
directlywhen interest rates vary whether it is
the real rate, or expected inflation, or both
that has changed.
inflation anticipated over the life ofthe
investment) which compensates for the
erosion ofthe purchasing powerofthe
principal; and the "real" rate, which is
effectively the amount ofadditional pur-
chasing power the investor obtains. Both
variables are plainly ofconcern to policy-
makers but for different reasons. The real,
rather than the nominal, interest rate most
directly influences real spending and hence
is an indicatorofmonetary policy's influ-
ence on economic activity. The inflation
premium measures the public's anticipation
offuture priceincreases and, thus, is agauge
ofthe credibilityofthe authorities' com-
mitmentto contain inflation.
Foreign exchange rates are apt to be most
helpful in interpreting changes in domestic
interest rates, particularly longer-term rates.
Any nominal interest rate is the sum oftwo
parts: an inflation "premium" (equal to the
An unwelcome effect of recent financial
innovations has been to complicate greatly
the interpretation ofthe traditional monetary
aggregates, M 1 and M2, by blurringthe
distinction between checking and savings
accounts. Very likely, these changes have
altered relations between the aggregates and
the spending, interest rate, and inflation
goals ofmonetary policy, although by how
much and forhowlong is quiteuncertain. As
a result, authorities are in danger of "flying
blind" over the coming year in setting
money growth targets they cannot be con-
fident will have the same economic effects
they once had.
Naturally, the search has intensified for
alternative measures to help steer monetary
policy. Alongwith conventional suggestions
-the monetary base, norninal and real
(somehow measured) interest rates-has
come a more novel proposal: to use the
foreign exchange value ofthe dollar as a
guideto policy. But what guidance could
exchange rates provide that could not be
furnished by purely domestic indicators?
Indicators
The most likely way exchange rates might
be useful in guidingmonetary policy is by
serving as indicators ofthe economic con-
ditions with which policy is concerned.
Exchange rates are affected by certain
domestic economic factors such as real
interest rates and expected inflation that are
not directly measurable, or only imperfectly
so. Thus, movements in exchanges rates
provide"clues,"orinformation, aboutthese
variables that, when used with other avail-
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percentage points from mid-1980 through
1981, yet there was virtually no consensus
among observers as to why. Some argued
that the trend mainly reflected an increase in
real interest rates due to the substantial
slowing ofgrowth in the measured money
aggregates. Others asserted that rising
interest rates reflected increases in expected
future inflation due to fears that prospec-
tivel,' enormous government budget deficits
would lead to higher future money growth.
So, according to the first explanation the
Federal Reserve could lowerinterestrates by
raising money growth to bringdown real
rates; while according to the second it
should slow money growthto calm inflation
concerns (or, perhaps, persuade the admin-
istration to reduce the deficit.)
Exchange rate signals
Exchange rates can helpin interpretingsuch
interest rate movementsmainlybecause real
interest rates and expected inflation affect
them quitedifferently-indeed in opposite
directions. Ultimately, the dollar's foreign
exchange value must move to keep the
prices of U.S. and foreign products in world
markets at the "competitive" level dictated
by their demands and supplies. In the long-
run, then, the dollar's value will vary with
the domestic level of U.S. prices compared
to those abroad-its "purchasing power
parity" (PPP) value-and the competitive-
ness of U.s. goods.
In this way, increases in our expected infla-
tion tend mainly to lower the forward value
of the dollar, reflecting the market's percep-
tion of its future level. In the short-run,
though, thedollarmaybe,pushed awayfrom
its PPP value by real interest fluctuations
(relative to those abroad), arising from
temporary fluctuations in credit markets,
that attract or repel international capital
from our shore. Increases in U.s. real interest
rates, then, tend to raise thespotvalueofthe
dollar, both absolutely and relative to its PPP
level. But, given the temporary nature of
such fluctuations, real interest rates tend to
2
have little influenceon longer-term forward
values of the dollar.
In short, a real increase in U.S. interest rates
relative to abroad raises the spot dollar,
while a rise in our expected inflation lowers
the dollar's forward value (Chart 1). This
reasoningcan beapplied in reverse. A rise in
U.S. interest rates that is accompanied by a
rise in the spotvalueofthedollar(relative to
PPP) can'be viewed as an indication that
U.S. longer-term real interest rates have
risen. Alternatively, ifinterest rates here rise,
while the forward value ofthe dollar
declines, there is reason to suspect that
long-term expected u.s. inflation has gone
up. (Of course, a rise in nominal rates could
reflect an increase in both expected inflation
and the real interest rates, and thus could be
accompanied by a spot rate increase and a
forward rate decline).
Viewed in this way, foreign exchange
markets did provide significant "clues" as
to the cause ofour interest rate increases in
1980 and 1981. During this period, the
dollar's spotvalue rose above its PPP level to
an unprecedented degree, while the five-
year forward value also increased (Chart 2).
This pattern suggests that U.S. real interest
rates increased substantially overthis
period, while our expected inflation would
appear to have fallen, at least relative to
expected inflation abroad.
Exchange rates might also have served as an
early warning of impending inflation during
1976 and early 1977. Although money
growth accelerated significantly then, in-
terest rates actually fell slightly, while the
ensuing inflation (in consumer prices) did
not become evident until 1978. However,
theforward (and spot) valueofthedollardid
begin to decline rapidly by the end of 1976,
a trend that, in retrospect, wasa signal ofthe
inflationary pressures that were building up.
Caution
Still, the signals provided by exchange rate
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*TradeMweighted index: foreign wholesale prices to U.s.
wholesale prices.
**Trade-weighted value of the u.s. dollar in terms of the
currencies 9f 15 trading pMners.
More important, though, exchange rates are
only one source of information available to
authorities, so policymust be guided as well
bythe signals from domestic indicators such
as the money-aggregates, real growth, and
inflation trends. Exchange rates are best
viewed as supplements to the conventional
measures that have guided policy in the
past. And, possibly, once the adjustment to
financial innovations is complete, the
money aggregates (perhaps revised) may
once again provide a reasonably clear indi-
cation of the economy's direction, reducing
the need to rely on the exchange rate or
other less conventional indicators. Still, as
past experience has shown, exchange rates
are likely to continue to be useful to policy
makers, ifonly as "alarms" signaling that
public perceptions about the ultimate
courSe ofpolicy may be diverging danger-
ously from official intentions.
Charles Pigott
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Still useful
Nonetheless, these ambiguities (which
are shared to some degree by nearly all
economic indicators) mean'simply that
exchange rate indicators must be used with
considerable care; they do not render them
useless as guides to policy. At the least,
though, authorities will have to evaluate
current and prospective economic condi-
tions abroad, as well as factors that might
have altered the international competitive-
ness ofU.S. products, in interpreting
exchange rate movements. Clearly, these
signals will be easiest to read when foreign
economic conditions are relatively stable,
and very difficultto interpret when they are
highly volatile.
1981 weresignalingarise in ourreal interest
rates only because the dollar was much
further above its PPP level than it had been
in recent experience. Again, not every





This experience also suggests that exchange
rate trends generally will provide the
clearest indicators of U.S. conditions when
foreign conditions are most stable and pre-
dictable. Thus, movements in the dollar
versus the Swiss franc, given Switzerland's
comparatively stable inflation record, are
apt to be more informative to ourown
policymakers than the dollar's fluctuations
against currencies issued by nations with
less enviable performances.
Similarly, many factors can alter the long-
run competitiveness ofthe U.S. dollar,
causing itto deviate persistently from PPP.
Not all departures from PPP, therefore,
mean that real interest rates have changed.
In fact, there is substantial evidence to
suggest that real interest rates varied little
prior to 1979, so that departures from PPP
mainly reflected shifts in competitiveness.
We could be confident that exchange rate
trends duringthe last halfof1980and during
*Spot and 5-yeiJr forward rates are DM/$. The interest rate
is the S-year Eurodollar rilte.
Forexample, although u.s. interest rates fell
considerably during 1982, the dollar has
remained remarkably strong. Viewed alone,
this pattern might suggest a substantial drop
in our expected inflation, but little ifany
drop in our real interest rates. However,
foreign interest rates also fell sharply during
this period, in some cases by nearly as much
as our own. The Swiss five-year rate, for
example, declined by nearly Spercentage
points last year. Moreover, recent inflation
trends in Switzerland do not point to any
dramatic improvement in its longer-term
inflation outlook, suggesting that Swiss real
interest rates have fallen sharply. Ifso, then
u.s. real interest rates must also have de-
clined considerably, forotherwisethe dollar
would have soared much further against the
Swiss franc last year.
all, the foreign exchange value ofthe dollar
reflects conditions abroad, as well as those
in the U.S. The implications ofexchange
rate trends thus can easilybe misread unless
foreign conditions are taken into account.SSV10 lSl:Il:l
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments*" 163,582 - 26 6,368 4.0
Loans (gr05s, adjusted) - total# 142,496 - 31 6,770 5.0
Commercial and industrial 45,106 - 229 3,473 83
Real estate 57,368 - 55 991 1.8
loansto individuals 23,841 - 49 252 1.1
Securities loans 2,754 299 836 44.0
U.S. Treasury securities'" 7,561 116 1,385 22.4
Other securities*" 13,525 - 91 - 1,787 - 11.7
Demand deposits - total# 37,668 -2,553 - 787 2.0
Demand deposits - adjusted 27,092 - 836 - 406 - 15
Savings deposits - total 57,518 1,504 27,193 89.7
Time deposits - total# 77,385 -1,810 - 13,837 - 15.2
Individuals, part. & corp. 68,391 -1,630 - 13,809 - 16.8
(large negotiableCD's) 26,317 - 534 - 10,060 - 2.9
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency (-)
Borrowings
















* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments may be addressed totheeditor (Gregory Tong) or to the author .... Freecopies of this
andother Federal Reserve publicationscanbeobtained bycallingorwritingthe Public InfonnationSection,
federal Reserve Bank ofSan francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974~2246.